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Summary
This article discusses to what extent meanings and discourses on ‘EU mem-
bership’ on the one hand and on the ‘Balkans’ on the other, have shifted within 
Western Balkan countries in the past few years as a result of financial crisis in 
the European Union. Focusing on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
article uses Derrida’s deconstruction to problematize the return of terms such 
as ‘Balkan’ and ‘Balkanized’, as a way to explain failures of the economic 
system. The article concludes that in the case of BH and to a lesser extent in 
Kosovo, there has been a de-mythicization of the EU.
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Introduction 
The relations between the EU and the Western Balkans1 are characterized by a rocky 
trajectory of progress, detachment and cautiousness. From the 1990s onwards, the 
changing political and economic landscape of the Western Balkans has had its im-
pact on the way both parts construct their relations. Even though neither the EU, nor 
the Western Balkans, or the Balkans for that matter, can be looked at as ‘monoliths’, 
a series of turbulent memories in the Balkan peninsula (i.e. World War I) and events 
(i.e. the break-up of Yugoslavia) have had a significant impact in the construction of 
the EU’s narratives towards the Western Balkans. Since the 1990s, the EU has been 
oscillating between the EU as a virtually promised peaceful future for the Western 
Balkans (EU membership) on the one hand, and the EU as a cautious entity with re-
gard to its ‘hospitality’ (EU membership) towards the Western Balkans on the other.
This article explores how narratives in the Western Balkans with regard to the 
EU changed after the Euro-crisis. Mapping new narratives (as in meanings) that 
1 Western Balkans is a term mainly used by the European Union for countries in South-East Eu-
rope which are not part of the European Union. 
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have come out throughout and after the Euro-crisis, the article argues that while the 
‘euro-crisis’ itself has had its impact in the way the EU is perceived in the Western 
Balkans, it was the wave of protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo which 
further de-mythicized the EU and more broadly the EU future for the Western Bal-
kans. The article concludes that the Euro-crisis coupled with the wave of protests 
mark a new detachment in EU-WB relations, albeit not an explicit one. 
To problematize and interpret the narratives of both camps, I use ‘deconstruc-
tion’ as conceptualized by Jacques Derrida. Being in the contours of post-structural-
ism, deconstruction offers a unique possibility in analysing discourse and text, and 
in unveiling their shifting character. Deconstruction, or as Derrida calls it ‘interven-
tion’, “de-totalizes self-enclosed totalities by placing them face to face with their 
internal differentiation enabling us to see the partiality of the partial, not by itself 
giving an absolute reading, but by attempting to show that no absolute reading is at 
all possible” (Nuyen, 1989).
In the case of the Western Balkans, my focus will be on Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Kosovo. Internally, both countries have been subjected to a long and 
structural EU presence, which was instrumental in setting the paths both countries 
were to take. Externally, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have the echo 
of being ‘international projects’ with the EU being their greatest donor per capita in 
the world. In addition to the dependence on financial assistance, the dependence of 
both countries on the EU is enhanced by their peculiar sovereignty consolidation. 
In January 2014, hundreds of demonstrators demanded the immediate resigna-
tion of staff at the University of Priština over allegations of corruption and plagia-
rism. Ibrahim Gashi, the rector of the university, stepped down from his position 
after being accused of having published work in a phony Indian-based academ-
ic journal. The wave of protests continued with further demands of the protesters 
“to release the University of Pristina from corrupted and unprofessional academic 
staff who have taken these positions through political partisanship and nepotism” 
(Kadriu, 2014). A dozen protesters and policemen were injured. A month later, in 
February, protests kicked off in the city of Tuzla, where the laid-off workers of five 
bankrupted factories staged a protest to get their unpaid pensions and health insur-
ance back (Vermeersch and Dejaeghere, 2015). The wave of protests spread across 
the country, marking this as the biggest protest wave the country has seen since the 
end of the war. Arsenijević argued that “protests and plenums are the only genuinely 
novel development in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the end of the war in 1995” 
(2014). Immediately after the first demonstrations in the industrial town of Tuzla 
on February 7, the protests brought about the formation of the first plenum, a local 
citizens’ assembly – based on direct democratic participation, involving hundreds 
of people (Hajdarpašić, 2014).
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A Snapshot of the EU in the Western Balkans
The Western Balkans in general, and BH and Kosovo in particular, have been pre-
sent in the EU’s discourse and foreign policy agenda since the 1990s. After the 
‘Kosovo crisis’ in 1999, the EU opened the possibility of ‘virtual membership’ for 
the Western Balkans on grounds of 1) the proclaimed solidarity of the EU with cri-
sis areas and 2) the duty to help those plagued by catastrophes (Solana, 2000). The 
EU’s enhanced support in the ‘virtual membership’ is particularly vivid in the cases 
of BH and Kosovo due to the unprecedented structural and conceptual presence in 
both countries. For the first time in its history, the EU is in the process of building its 
future member states, by supporting their state-building and aid programs (Musliu, 
2014). These future member states are to exemplify ‘genuine’ EU member states, 
given that both are structures that float between independent states, (semi)protector-
ates and post-modern entities, among others.
To exemplify, both Kosovo’s and BH’s state identity elements (flag, national 
anthem, constitution) have more resemblance with the EU than any other old/new 
EU member state. Their sovereignties are transferred to Brussels, what Chandler 
has coined as inverse sovereignty (Chandler, 2006). Both countries are constitu-
tionally declared to be multi-ethnic states, even though, in the case of Kosovo, the 
Albanian majority comprises over 90% of the population. A couple of questions are 
imperative to problematize in this regard. Does this make BH and Kosovo the first 
genuine EU countries? Is the EU expected to be more hospitable, as in willing to 
make the two countries part of the ‘European family’, given the EU’s financial and 
conceptual support in making them genuinely ‘European’ (Musliu, 2014)?
Since Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans, a lot has been written on the mean-
ings and discourses as representational to EU-Western Balkans relations. A plethora 
of literature analyses the impact of the Euro-crisis on the EU’s external relations, 
EU enlargement, etc. (see Karasavvoglou and Polychronidou, 2013; Turcilo, 2013; 
Bechev, 2012). According to De Ville and Orbie (2014), the vast literature on the 
Euro-crisis is dominated by rationalist accounts of a financial assessment of the cri-
sis. The social and identity dimensions affected by the crisis are largely neglected, 
let alone contributions that take a more epistemological turn on concepts and narra-
tives affected by it. Whereas most discursive accounts embark on post-colonial and 
double-reading approaches evidenced in the work of Edward Said and Maria To-
dorova, this article is one of the very few post-structuralist accounts on EU-Western 
Balkans relations in general.
What follows is first an overview of the EU’s narratives on the Western Bal-
kans as the Euro-crisis unfolded, and second, the way narratives in the Western Bal-
kans on the EU have changed throughout and after the waves of protests.
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The EU in Crisis. What Is in a Name?
The Eurozone crisis (Euro-crisis) which started in 2009 due to weak economic 
growth and forecasts, large debts and competitive weakness, affected the econo-
mies of the member states. Several countries in the zone could not repay their debts 
without the assistance of the European Central Bank and/or the International Mo-
netary Fund. The consequences of the crisis have become all the more prominent, 
both in the everyday lives of European citizens and in the official political agendas 
of their local and international institutional representatives (ibid.). The crisis has 
had its impact in other dimensions, both within the EU and in regard to its relations 
with non-EU. De Ville and Orbie explain that “while in the first months following 
the full-scale explosion of the mortgage-cum-financial crisis in the United States, 
many European prominent figures were self-assuredly touting the superiority of the 
European model of social, regulated and bank-based capitalism; since the outbreak 
of the Greek crisis, this self-confidence has quickly melted away” (ibid.). Drawing 
on the work of De Sousa Santos on a de-colonial undertaking, Stamenković ex-
plains the current political rationality that is stretching out to the so-called Euro-cri-
sis. For him, this does not only apply to the context of so-called mental health crisis 
in Europe, nor does it apply to the so-called economic crisis, behind which hides 
the actual crisis of authority of the global neoliberal capitalist regime. Instead, “this 
task applies to the context of another, epistemic crisis (or the crisis of knowledge, 
its production and re-production) which is inseparable from the neoliberal project 
of today” (Stamenković, 2013).
Either as a supranational entity or as an equivalent of ‘Europe’, the EU has 
been (self)defined in opposition to others throughout time. Situated in the ‘West’, 
its others have traditionally been the East, the South, the Orient, and the Balkans. 
‘The East’ and ‘the South’ appear to be more temporal ‘others’ that have in time 
shifted in the ‘West’. Concretely, this was the case with Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries prior to the fall of communism. Current narratives in Brussels 
(mainly from EU officials) make obvious reference to the Czech Republic as be-
ing unequivocally European – non-other. Goddereris (2013) reminds us that while 
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s the discourse of ‘East Europe’ was fair-
ly present, towards the end of the 2000s, it was the ‘South’/’North’ division that 
gained prominence, fading away the ‘East’/’West’ dichotomy. The ‘otherness’ of 
the South (Greece, Spain) was historically constructed through their legacy with 
authoritarianism. The South as ‘other’ faded away with Spain and Greece appearing 
unequivocally ‘EU’ and ‘Western’ up until the financial crisis, when the otherness 
of the ‘South’ was underlined again. Categories like ‘West’, ‘North’ and ‘South’ in 
these narratives are not simple geographical notions. Their existence is based on 
their definition against its others. Derrida called them binary opposites. According 
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to him, Western metaphysics is based on the binary opposites of good vs. bad, ra-
tionality vs. spirituality, nature vs. culture, etc. These binary opposites do not have 
a peaceful co-existence; in fact, they are violent hierarchies (ibid.).
The violent hierarchies reintroduce ‘South’ as a problematic category to-
wards the ‘North’. In this sense the ‘North’ refers to the ‘hard-working’, ‘disci-
plined’ Dutch, Germans, Swedes etc., whereas the ‘South’ refers to the ‘easy-going’ 
‘(slightly) lazy’ Greeks, Portuguese, etc. In a similar way, Ntampoudi argues that 
precisely these hierarchies in turn – albeit in their in-totality, temporality and in-
terruptibility – create and (re)introduce narratives of the EU’s ‘others’. She argues 
that the media and elite rhetoric has constructed both German and Greek citizens as 
prototypical representatives of Core Europe and Periphery of Europe (Ntampoudi, 
2013b). Anchored around the economic acronym PIGS, which stands for Portugal, 
Italy, Greece and Spain, these narratives are built on the premises that the origins of 
the Eurozone crisis are to be found in the fiscal profligac y of PIGS countries which 
are accustomed to live beyond their means and work less than other Europeans. 
The ‘Balkans’ Returns
The same ‘return’ is also witnessed with regard to the ‘Balkans’. Spectres of the 
‘Balkans’ and ‘Balkanization’ are apparent both in relation to the Euro-crisis and the 
wave of protests in BH and Kosovo. The term ‘spectres’ is taken from Derrida’s ac-
count ‘Spectres of Marx’. Alike in his account, ‘Spectres of Balkanization’ is used 
to denote the unstable narratives in the Balkans; narratives that are not here, not 
present, but existing; that are absent and present at the same time; legitimate and il-
legitimate at the same time (Derrida, 2006).
Greece was the first country of the Balkan Peninsula to join the EU. This way, 
Greece had ceased being ‘Balkan’ and became ‘European’ instead. De Ville and 
Orbie explain that while initially the discourse was pointing to the crisis in Europe 
with the labels of financial and economic crisis, after the Greek bailout the dis-
course shifted and everyone was talking about the ‘euro’ or ‘sovereign’ debt: “This 
is not a trivial change of wording: thereby the blame was shifted from the market 
to the state” (2014), making Greece the focal point of the crisis. Along with this, 
Greece was therefore shifted back in the ‘Balkan’ club, through which a lot of the 
characteristics of the ‘South’ were substantiated with Greece’s other identity layer 
– the Balkans. This in turn re-introduced a discourse that would attribute the root of 
the crisis to aspects of ‘Balkanization’2.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines ‘Balkanization’ as a division of multi-
national state into smaller ethnically homogenous entities. The term was initially 
2 The term will be elaborated in the following section. 
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coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation 
that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans (En-
cyclopaedia Britannica, 2000). Todorova (2009) argues that what has been empha-
sized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the stand-
ards of behaviour devised as normative by and for the civilized world. To this day, 
‘Balkanization’ has come to be associated with a number of ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘dis-
eases’ in several fields, including computer science (Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson, 
2005), medicine (Schmidt et al., 2008), history (Patterson, 1995), demography stu-
dies (Ellis and Wright, 1998), etc. 
Observing the developments from Belgium and from contacts with EU offi-
cials in Brussels, it became evident that as the Euro-crisis was unfolding, more nar-
ratives referring to characteristics of the ‘easy South’ and/or (slightly) ‘chaotic Bal-
kans’ became prominent. The ‘Balkanization’ of Greece implicitly put the Western 
Balkans on the map of crisis too, where again the ‘Balkans’ appears as a monolith 
that is unreliable and unpredictable. For many scholars, the Greek crisis has created 
another – non-quantifiable, but very potent – discrediting of the Balkans, and has 
fuelled criticism to propagate the perception of the entire Balkan region as an unre-
liable area of corruption and instability (Panagiotou, 2013).
The Protests and the De-mythicization of ‘Europe’
The 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina marked the first time since the end of 
the war in BH that people from the three ethnic groups protested for a common con-
cern, outside of the ethnic matrix. The slogan ‘We are hungry in three languages!’ 
(Gladni smo na tri jezika!) is an indication of an awakening of citizen rights, not 
merely minority or ethnic rights among the protesters. For Asim Mujkić, professor 
at the University of Sarajevo, the Bosnians “have shown that they are maturing as 
democratic citizens, that they are becoming subjects of change and are no longer 
the simple objects of the sadism directed at them by the party oligarchies” (Mujkić, 
2014). In his edited volume, Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Fight for the 
Commons, Arsenijević affirms this benchmark and links the insistence on equality 
with the concept of ‘unbribability’ – as an individual and collective refusal to be 
bribed and coerced into submission and servility.
Initially, the international response towards the protests in BH was confusing 
on the political level and orientalist at a more general, media level. The EU foreign 
ministers were repeating the phrase that citizens should have the right to protest, 
but that they should remain peaceful. With regard to the international media, the 
orientalist discourse returned. Bieber (2013) explains the tendency of various in-
ternational media (Newsweek) of evoking violence and war as a typical part of the 
exotic Balkans. More than orientalist, he calls the reporting ‘ignorant’, in that it 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 4-5, 2015, pp. 32-42
38
failed to grasp the non-ethnic character of the events. It appears that every time a 
crisis or unrest surfaces in the Balkans, the international media reintroduce the list 
of stereotypes on ‘Balkanization’ through which the region is portrayed as some-
thing intrinsically corrupt, ungovernable and beyond repair. For instance, during the 
March riots of 2004 in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians, which led to over 20 
casualties and the burning of several Serbian orthodox churches, the international 
media seemed to be recycling the discourse and the tone of the 1990s in reporting. 
The cover page of The Independent of March, 19, 2004 stated “Burning churches, 
ruined homes and ethnic hatred. Are the Balkans set to explode again?” (Xharra and 
Tanner, 2004). Even though the nature of ‘riots’ of 2014 is not comparable to those 
of 2004 or the 1990s for that matter, the discourse does not seem to have changed 
much. 
At the same time, scholars of EU Studies and EU enlargement were voicing the 
possibility for the insemination of anti-EU sentiment in the region (Panaritis, 2014). 
Yet, rather than anti-EU sentiment, what the protests brought was a de-mythi-
cization of the EU. During my field work in Kosovo (2013) and also with the senti-
ment gathered from the ‘blogosphere’ in the Western Balkans, what seems to have 
resulted both from the Euro-crisis and the wave of protests alike, is the toning down 
of enthusiasm for the EU.
Since the end of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, both in Kosovo and 
maybe to a lesser extent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU has been seen as the 
main catalyst and actor to stabilize the region. Most countries in the Western Bal-
kans have shown a pro-EU stance, albeit to varying degrees. Around 76.5% of the 
total population of Bosnia and Herzegovina supports the EU accession. This per-
centage is higher in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (79%) than in Re-
publika Srpska (67%) (Valić Nedeljković and Kleut, 2013). Traditionally, the main 
reasons for this support were based on the possibility for better employment, gua-
rantee of permanent peace, political stability and freedom of movement (ibid.). Ko-
sovo, with one of the highest percentages of support for EU integration in the region 
with 87% (Wohlert, 2012), also sees EU integration positively with regard to better 
economic and employment opportunities and overall socio-political stability. 
Yet, 20 years after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 16 years after Ko-
sovo, the EU has remained a ‘virtual promise’. Even with its missions deployed 
in both countries, this ‘virtual promise’ did not translate into social and economic 
wellbeing, nor did it tackle high-level corruption, improve the system of educa-
tion, or further the prospects for development. In the meantime, local politicians re-
mained focused on macro-politics, predominantly inter-ethnic (BH) and sovereign-
ty matters (Kosovo), while remaining detached from the problems and challenges 
of everyday life. Unlike in the past, where the blame would fall (mostly) on local 
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politicians, the protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to a lesser extent in Kosovo 
too, maintained that both local and international actors present in the two countries 
were equally to blame. For Arsenijević, “local and international politicians, who in 
concert have maintained and allowed the parasitization of the unwieldy and nepo-
tistic ethnic bureaucratic structures, have exhausted the citizens of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina for almost twenty-two years” (2014).
Conclusion 
Although it is difficult and to some extent implausible to see a direct connection 
between the Euro-crisis and anti-corruption protests in BH and Kosovo, a series 
of events that are connected with the problems of economic crisis in the neolibe-
ral world did have a role in the timing and the messages of the protests. First of 
all, since the beginning of the ‘Occupy Movements’ in the United States, there has 
been transnational sympathy in other movements and protests in different parts of 
the world. Second, the outbreak of the Euro-crisis in Europe led to an increase of 
anti-austerity protests in Greece and Spain, a trend that spilled over in Turkey and 
Bulgaria, among others. In making a connection between protests in Sarajevo and 
the Taksim Gezi Park events in Turkey, Bieber argues that protesters “are young, 
urban, feel excluded from politics and government, and see no other way to change 
the status-quo than by protest” (2013).
In the case of BH and to a lesser extent Kosovo, the de-mythicization of the EU 
has started from within, given the overall dissatisfaction with the international and 
EU structural presence deployed in both countries. Whereas the protests in Kosovo 
showed that the protesters had lost patience with the current governmental struc-
tures, citizens of BH clearly had lost their patience with the international structures, 
local political elite, the Office of High Representative (OHR), and their overall in-
ability to solve systemic governmental deadlocks hampering daily lives of ordinary 
citizens. 
The de-mythicization of the EU indicates that, like any other concept, EU inte-
gration is an empty term. Unless it is fleshed out with actual deliverables, it remains 
a mirage. The protests in BH and to a lesser extent in Kosovo, the Euro-crisis and 
its effects have played an enhanced role in first elucidating the structural and deep-
seated systemic problems that are definitely to be dealt with domestically. Kurtović 
explains that for a while “internationals looked on in disbelief as their efforts to 
wave the carrot of EU accession fell flat, unable to garnish any meaningful atten-
tion – let alone mobilizing power – among the Bosnian public” (2014). She holds to 
the argument that the protests have shown that citizens of BH understood that “the 
International Community is a self-serving, self-interested and alienated centre of 
power that has never been working in support of citizens’ interests” (ibid.).
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Finally, it should be noted that the fall of enthusiasm for the EU in the Western 
Balkans, in addition to the Euro-crisis, is also a result of the enhanced enlargement 
requirements. The additional conditions to be fulfilled upon enlargement, the EU’s 
discourse that points to a halt in enlargement, following an increase in immigration 
numbers from the region upon visa liberalization, have altogether ‘de-mythicized’ 
the EU and the so-called ‘European future’.
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